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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

ARGUMENT
I:

PRlVAi*;
PROPERTY
IS CONST11 u TIONALLY
PROTECTED; THE TRIAL COURT MISUNDERSTOOD THAT
ONLY MINIMAL ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO RETAIN
THE PRIVATE CHARACTER OF PRIVATE ROADS.

Wasatch County and the trial court incorrectly viewed the Supreme Court's decision
as requiring that the landowner perform some act the sole purpose of which was to interrupt
public use. The issues in this case and the Supreme Court's test must be considered,
however, in light of the constitutional protections of private property. If the Dedication
Statute1 were interpreted to allow the public to take private property without just

'Utah Code § 72-5-104(1) (2006).
1

compensation, it would be unconstitutional.2 The statute must be viewed not as a grant, but
only a rule of evidence to evaluate whether the landowner voluntarily gave or dedicated the
road to the public.3 As correctly recognized in an early Utah case, before a road "becomes
public in character the owner of the land must consent to the change."4
Because intent was not recognized as relevant under the case law in effect at the time
of the initial trial, Okelberrys moved to reopen to allow evidence directly focused on their
intent.5 Even the limited evidence that was presented, however, still admits of only one
conclusion: Okelberrys viewed their land {all their land, including the roads) as private.
They viewed themselves as having the right to control use of their land (including the roads),
and acted in accordance with the fact that the land was private.
Thus, when Ray Okelberry locked the gates to assist in keeping his sheep enclosed,
although one of his intentions was to control the sheep, it is equally obvious that he intended
to keep people from opening the gate. He intended to interrupt their use of the road "as a
public thoroughfare." It was an action, fully consistent only with private property ownership,
that said, "I am choosing to not allow the public to freely use the road at this time."

2

See U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, § 22.

3

See Vaughn v. Williams, 345 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1977).

"Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 251, 161 P. 1127, 1131 (1916). The discussion on
pages 25-26 of Okelberrys' initial brief establishes that this requirement of intent is still valid
law in Utah.
5

R. 616-611.
2

The trial court's ruling must "should be construed together as a whole so as to give
meaning and force to all of its terms."6 While the trial court did express that no other witness
saw Ray Okelberry lock the gates7 and acknowledged Ray's self interest, the court also said,
"The Court finds that while there may have been occasions in which Mr. Okelberry locked
the gates in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, these were few and far between, were not intended
to restrict public access, and were not reasonably calculated to interrupt public use of the
roads."8 This can only be viewed as a finding that Ray Okelberry had locked gates, together
with a conclusion that the locking was not legally sufficient to meet the Supreme Court's
standard. The three purported legal defects identified by the trial court, however, reveal a
fundamental misunderstanding of the test established by the Supreme Court.
In reviewing the evidence regarding the three purported legal defects, it is important
to remember the burdens of proof. After stating its new bright-line rule, the Supreme Court
stated:
This rule does not change the burden of the party claiming
dedication. For a highway to be deemed dedicated to the public,
the party claiming dedication must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the road at issue was continuously

6

Hubble v. Cache County Drainage Dist., 123 Utah 405, 410, 259 P.2d 893, 896

(1953).
7

Lee Okelberry testified that he didn't lock the gates, but said nothing about whether
Ray may have done so. Trial Transcript, June 30,2004, at 141. Lee Okelberry operated on
a different part of the property, and thus had no occasion to go through some of the gates
locked by Ray Okelberry when the sheep were being moved. Trial Transcript, June 29,2004,
at 201. His testimony did not contradict the testimony of Ray Okelberry.
8

R. 670.
3

used as a public thoroughfare for a period often years; credible
evidence of the type of interruption defined above—an overt act
intended to and reasonably calculated to interrupt use of a road
as a public thoroughfare—simply precludes a finding of
continuous use.9
In other words, while Wasatch County had a burden of proving its case by clear and
convincing evidence, Okelberrys' evidence did not need to meet that standard. The standard
applicable to Okelberrys' evidence was that it be credible.
The trial court found the occasions when Ray Okelberry locked the gates were "few
and far between." All that is required, however, is one instance of blocking every ten years.
The fact that the gate locking was few and far between does not defeat its legal effect.
The trial court "found" that the locked gates were not intended to restrict pubic
access.10 Reading the ruling as a whole, however, reveals that the trial court concluded that
because the gate was locked only occasionally, and because few if any people were blocked,
therefore Ray Okelberry must not have intended to restrict public access. Again, the law is
otherwise. And, there could be no other purpose for locking the gates except to prevent
public access. Sheep can't tell the difference between a locked gate and one that is merely
wired shut. The only possible purpose of a lock is to prevent a human from entering.

"Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, \ 15, 179 P.3d 768.
10

It must be remembered that Okelberrys did not present direct evidence of intent
because that was not relevant under the case law in effect at the time of trial. See Point III
below.
4

It is apparent the court acknowledged Ray Okelberry had occasionally locked the gates to
assist in controlling his sheep, but thought there needed to be something more dramatic to
show "intent" to interrupt public use of the road.
The trial court also "found" that the locked gates "were not reasonably calculated to
interrupt public use of the roads."11 Again, it appears the trial court believed there had to be
some major action that "interrupted public use of the roads generally."12 Okelberrys were
not required to "construct reinforced fencing" together with "the installation of additional
physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors"13 along all points of access to the
property. This was Okelberrys' private property. All that was needed was some sufficient
action to show their intent to retain that private character, to show that they did not consent
to it being changed to a public road. If the gates were locked at all, that would have
interrupted public use of the roads. As demonstrated in Town of Leeds v. Prisbrey,14 it does
not matter that no one was actually prevented from using the roads. And, the Supreme Court
in this case emphasized that if the action would have interrupted public use on a heavily

n

R. 670.

12

R.671.

13

Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (8 U.S.C.§ 1103 note), as amended by P.L. 110-161, DivE, Title V, § 564,121 Stat.
2090, which provides for fencing along parts of the border between the United States and
Mexico.
14

2008UT11, 179P.3d757.
5

traveled road, the action would be legally sufficient to interrupt public use on a lightly
traveled road:
We emphasize here, however, that the action necessary by the
landowner to establish an interruption in public use does not
vary depending on the level of public use. An overt act intended
and reasonably calculated to interrupt public use restarts the
statutory period, and the effectiveness of such act is not tied to
the level of public use. In other words, an act by a landowner
sufficient to interrupt public use of a road used on a daily basis
by the public is also sufficient to interrupt public use of a road
used on a monthly basis by the public.15
The trial court's statements that Okelberrys' evidence failed to show that they
"interrupted public use of the roads generally," coupled with the conclusion that "while there
may have been occasions in which Mr. Okelberry locked the gates in the 1950s, 1960s, and
1970s," these actions were legally insufficient, show that the trial court did not understand
the minimal nature of the actions necessary to retain the private character of the roads. The
decision of the trial court must be reversed with instructions to hold that the roads are private.

II:

LEE OKELBERRY INTERRUPTED USE OF THE ROAD AS A
PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE BY STOPPING PERSONS TO
JUDGE WHETHER THEIR PURPOSE IN USING THE ROADS
WAS ACCEPTABLE.

The trial court summarized Lee Okelberry's testimony as follows:
He testified that he occasionally he stopped and talked to people
on Parker Canyon Road in the 1950s.... If there was any that
needed to go through there in any way, shape or form they could

Okelberry, *h 17.
6

ask or they could go through there. We never turned nobody
down that had any business down in there.16
In other words, the trial court found that Lee Okelberry stopped people "on" the roads
to inquire as to their business, and then let them go through because he approved of their
purpose in using the roads. Wasatch County asserts that in Utah County v. Butler,17 the Utah
Supreme Court rejected as insufficient evidence that the landowner has ejected persons from
the property.18 In Butler, however, the trespasser asked to leave was "hunting well off the
Road" and was not asked to leave the road itself.19
There was no requirement that Lee Okelberry actually eject someone. His acts in
stopping to pass judgment on the purpose of those using the roads interrupted use of the
roads as a public thoroughfare - somewhere the public had a right to go without interruption.
No one using a public road would expect to be stopped and questioned by adjoining
landowners. Lee Okelberry's actions were consistent only with his intent and belief that the
roads were private and he had a right to stop people and inquire as to their purpose.
This Court should hold that the actions of Lee Okelberry in stopping people who were
using the roads constituted an overt act which was intended to and did interrupt use of the
roads as a public thoroughfare.

R. 674 \ 14.
2008UT12, 179P.3d775.
'Wasatch County brief at 8.
'2008 UT 12 at U 17.
7

Ill:

OKELBERRYS ARE ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE OF INTENT ADDRESSING THE NEW
TEST ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT; EVIDENCE OF
CONTROL IS NOT THE SAME AS EVIDENCE OF INTENT.

Wasatch County asserts as "Okelberrys did their best to try and show that they
intended to disrupt the use of the roads by the public."20 What Okelberrys did, however, was
show physical efforts to control or limit public use. There was little or no testimony on the
intentions behind those actions.
The trial court based its ruling largely on the lack of testimony concerning subjective
intent. The trial court rejected Okelberrys5 evidence that they asked people to leave the roads
because "[n]one of Defendants' witnesses testified that there was a regular policy of
requiring permission or approval to use the roads during that period, nor that asking persons
to leave the property was intended to restrict public access to the roads themselves."21
Addressing the "keep out" and "no trespassing" signs, the trial court said, "Yet none of
Defendants' witnesses at trial specified their intent when putting up the signs . . . ."22 With
respect to the locked gates, again the trial court focused on Ray Okelberry's intention,
concluding that the gates "were not erected or locked with the requisite intent."23

20

Wasatch County brief at 24.

21

R.671.

21

Id.

23

R. 670.

Okelher *

-

J

ence of their actions, out did not present evidence oi their

subjective intent m performing those actions. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in this
case, the cases held that subjective intent was irrelevant

Lraki uie Supreme I nini's test,

as recognized b} the ti ial CCIIII n It, subject e i ntent is nc • < ? < ei } i ele1 ant.
1

a uuid the trial com t abused its discretion in denying Okelberrys'

motion for leave to present additional evidence, and remand for a new trial where Okelberrys
may present that evidence,
IV:

MAINTENANCE O

'

INTERRUPTION.
As an additional argument showing that unlocked gates must be treated, as an
inten uption of public use, Okelberrys argued that a contrary rule would result in the public
taking i = . ;u u..;

.

..,.

>

s

. * «i

»•-..;

r i -•• '• ^ n
'ir'* in11" i] - ()keiberrv^ **"ght be requiicu to
remove those gates.2* This property is used for sheep and cattle, and u^hout gates, the use
and value of the entire property is impacted. Wasatch County asserts this is a new argument

understood, however, it is evident that the argument was raised below.

24

See cases and discussion at pages 26-27 of Okelberrys' initial brief See also Clay
Alger, Comment, Use Interrupted
7At Complicated Evolution of Utah's Highway
Dedication Doctrine,200%UtdhL. Rev. 1613, 1635 ("thr bright line test brought intent back
into the analysis"),
25

0kelberrys' initial brief at 33-34.

26

Wasatch County brief at 16-17.
9

The evidence was unanimous that there have always been gates across these roads.
In fact, when Okelberry tried to elicit additional evidence on this subject at trial, the judge
sua sponte stopped the questioning, stating there was no dispute among the witnesses as to
the location of the gates.27 The court specifically found "there were gates at the entrances
to each of the roads from 1957 to 2004."28
Okelberrys argued repeatedly below that the presence of unlocked gates constitutes
an interruption of public use.29 Okelberrys also argued that the state and federal constitutions
prohibit taking a road over private property unless the landowner dedicates that road to the
public. For example, Okelberrys presented the following argument to the trial court:
The law does not impose on a landowner the duty to protect and
preserve his own property; rather, the law is supposed to protect
that property. Only by the clearest of evidence can the law
justify declaring that the landowner has dedicated a road to the
public. Although the Supreme Court held that excluding
members of the public is one way to prevent a road from
becoming public, it did not hold it was the only way. Consistent
with the constitutional prohibition of taking private property
without paying just compensation, the County can prevail only
if it proves there was "a giving by the landowner rather than a
taking by the public authority." The cases cited in Okelberry's
initial memorandum show that the presence of closed gates,
even if unlocked, negate any inference that Okelberrys "gave"
their private property to the public.30

27

Transcript June 29, 2004, page 158.

28

R. 673 H 20.

29

E.g.,R. 622-621.

30

R. 656 (citations and other footnotes omitted).
10

Although Okelbenys did not make the specific argument that forcing the removal of
the gates will result in the County taking more than Okelbenys gave, Okelbenys clearly did
argue that the presence of ^iu*cd, uniucrau gates was an interruption of public use and
prevent the i oads fit: om becoming pi lblic.
In the recent case of Innerlight, Inc. v. Matrix Crony LLi \ u the court considered
whether an argument had been properly raised bekm

I he issue was whether a forum

selection clause was enforceable, IViai.^ .u,w *.;,..i.* * ^ - ...,a ^iause tx**w by arguing that

Supreme Court held the issue was nevertheless properly raised:
On appeal, Matrix argues that the forum selection and choice of
law provisions of the Contract are enforceable. In so arguing,
Matrix does not specifically contend that the forum selection
clause and choice of law provisions are enforceable apart from
the condition precedent in Section 2 of the Contract. Rather, it
argues that the forum selection and choice of law provisions are
enforceable because the condition precedent was fulfilled.
Although the specific reasoning behind Matrix's conclusion that
the forum selection and choice of la w provisions are enforceable
differs from this courts reasoning in reaching the same
conclusion, the lad remains that the main thrust of Matrix's
argument is that the forum selection and choice of law
provisions are enforceable We therefore inid that the
enforceability ••! the forum selection uid choice of law
provisions are properly at issue on appeal;32
This Couii niiuuiu m<m iu<if * JkUberrys proper1 v ..IUSLU <m aspects of their argument
that tin1 presencen! unlocked jjalescnnslilulesiiii mlrmiphoii Jim! Itial a \ onlian ml* w* uld
3I

?(MW i : r 3 i .

il

be unconstitutional because it would result in the County taking more than Okelberrys
abandoned.
Wasatch County also argues that to "allow a road that meets the requirements for
dedication to the public to be somehow limited in scope defeats the purpose of the statute and
is unworkable."33 This argument assumes that the public somehow has a right to take these
roads, and that the purpose of the statute is to grant the public a right to "take" roads. As
argued above,34 the Dedication Statute is not a grant, but only a rale of evidence to evaluate
whether a landowner has dedicated his or her property to the public. Any other rule would
result in an unconstitutional taking. While the County would obviously prefer to have roads
with no gates or other restrictions, the County can use the power of eminent domain to
remove those restrictions. Absent payment of just compensation, however, the County
cannot take what the landowner did not give.
This Court should hold that the constitutional protections of private property require
that either unlocked gates be considered an interruption, or that the gates be permitted to
remain even if the road is public.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in again requiring proof that Okelberrys "generally" or
"regularly" excluded members of the public from the roads. One intentional act every ten
years is sufficient to preserve private property, regardless of whether anyone's access was

33

Wasatch County brief at 5.

34

Pages 1-2.
12

(>kclbrrrys, then rniul.s were, tiol "continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of
ten years." The decision of the trial court should be reversed vv ith instructions to enter
judgment for Okelberrys.
D A I EDI his {S^d^
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